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Random number generation is an enabling technology
for fields as varied as Monte Carlo simulations and quan-
tum information science. An important application is a
secure quantum key distribution (QKD) system; here, we
propose and demonstrate an approach to random num-
ber generation that satisfies the specific requirements
for QKD. In our scheme, vacuum fluctuations of the
electromagnetic-field inside a laser cavity are sampled
in a discrete manner in time and amplified by injecting
current pulses into the laser. Random numbers can be
obtained by interfering the laser pulses with another in-
dependent laser operating at the same frequency. Using
only off-the-shelf opto-electronics and fibre-optics compo-
nents at 1.5 µm wavelength, we experimentally demon-
strate the generation of high-quality random bits at a
rate of up to 1.5 GHz. Our results show the potential
of the new scheme for practical information processing
applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The generation of true random numbers is highly desir-
able for digital information systems [1–3]. For instance,
in quantum key distribution (QKD), random bits are
used as a seed for creating secure keys shared between
two legitimate users [4–6]. Devices generating random
numbers by exploiting the unpredictable nature of quan-
tum processes are known as quantum random number
generators (QRNGs) [7–9]. Among all quantum physical
systems, photons are possibly the most promising as they
are easy to generate, manipulate and detect. Taking ad-
vantage of current photonics technology, QRNGs have
been demonstrated based on the detection of single pho-
tons in different modes [10–18], quantum non-locality of
entangled pairs of photons [19, 20], phase noise of lasers
[21–24, 29–33], vacuum-seeded bistable processes [27, 28]
and vacuum states [25, 26]. Yet, despite intense efforts to
develop high-quality and high-speed QRNGs, more work
is required for creating simple, cost-effective and practi-
cal devices.
In this paper, we propose and experimentally demon-
strate a quantum random number generation scheme
that is based on the creation of short laser pulses
with quantum-random phases [34]. QRNGs based on
such phase randomness have been demonstrated be-
fore: by interfering subsequent pulses in an unbalanced
Mach-Zender interferometer (UMZI), the phase random-
ness was mapped onto easily-detectable intensity varia-
tions [30–33]. However, due to pulse emission-time jitter,
the interference quality degrades significantly as the pulse
length approaches the emission-time uncertainty, which
limits the minimum pulse width and hence the maximum
pulse rate [31, 33]. In our scheme, the phase random-
ness of laser pulses is converted into intensity fluctua-
tions by interfering them with another continuous wave
laser featuring identical central frequency and polariza-
tion. The restriction of data acquisition to short time
windows aligned – possibly after pulse detection – with
the centres of the laser pulses effectively broadens and
equalizes the spectra of the continuous wave laser and the
pulsed laser, thereby ensuring high interference contrast
even at high pulse repetition rates. Thus, our method not
only inherently guarantees the temporal overlap needed
for good interference, but can also create random num-
bers with narrower laser pulses and hence higher gener-
ation rates. Using only off-the-shelf opto-electronic and
fiber-optic components at 1.5 µm wavelength, we perform
a proof-of-principle experiment of the proposed scheme
and extract high-quality quantum random numbers at a
rate of 1.5 GHz. Moreover, we discuss ways to improve
the performance, in particular the generation rate, of our
scheme.
II. PROPOSED SCHEME
Figure 1 (a) shows the idealized schematic of our ran-
dom number generation. A semiconductor laser, L1, is
operated in gain-switched mode. It is first biased far be-
low threshold, i.e. around 0 mA, and then driven signifi-
cantly above threshold using a short current pulse. This
pulse samples and amplifies the vacuum fluctuation of
the electromagnetic-field in the laser cavity, which results
in the generation of laser pulses with quantum-random
phases. Pulses from L1 are then superposed with the
output of a (quasi)-continuous wave laser, L2, using a
50/50 beam splitter (BS). Note that an optical isolator
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FIG. 1. (a) Schematic of our random number genera-
tor; (b) Picture of PCB board with gain-switched (pulsed)
laser and (quasi)-continuous wave laser; (c) Typical signal
from balanced-photo detector. L1: gain-switched laser; L2:
(quasi)-continuous wave laser; ISO: optical isolator; BS: 50/50
beam splitter; B-PD: balanced-photo detector; ADC: analog
to digital converter; RNE: randomness extractor; FPGA: field
programmable gate array.
(ISO) is used to avoid all light injecting into L1, thereby
preventing the generation of phase correlations between
laser pulses [35, 36].
The interfering pulses are detected by a balanced photo
detector (B-PD). Ignoring detector noise, the differential
voltage ∆V (t) output by the B-PD is
∆V (t) = 4× ηdE1(t)E2(t)sin[ϕ1(t)− ϕ2(t)], (1)
where ηd is the efficiency of the B-PD; E1(t), E2(t), ϕ1(t)
and ϕ2(t) are the amplitudes and phases of the light fields
from L1 and L2, respectively; and t = mT , where m is
an integer and T is the pulse period of L1. Since ϕ1(t)
is random, electrical pulses of random amplitudes are
obtained from B-PD.
To convert the pulses into raw bits, each pulse is input
into an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) that divides
the range of possible amplitudes into 2n bins. (As we
explain later, the maximum effective number of bins that
can be used, 2nmax , is determined by the min-entropy of
the signal from the B-PD [30].) With a voltage pulse from
the B-PD as its input, the output of the ADC is specified
by a vector with n binary numbers as the elements and
can be written as,
OADC = (b1, b2, ..., bn)
T , (2)
where bx = 0 or 1, x = 1, 2, ..., n. Then we send
the n bits into a field programmable gate array (FPGA)
that performs a randomness extraction procedure, result-
ing in true quantum-random bits. This procedure re-
quires n randomness extractors (RNEs). Each RNE cor-
responds to one specific bit bi(t) per ADC output (see
Fig. 1 (a)). Each RNE buffers 2m bits during 2m peri-
ods. All the bits buffered in the n RNEs form a n× 2m
matrix in the FPGA which is,
BF0 =

b1,1 b1,2 b1,3 . . . b1,2m
b2,1 b2,2 b2,3 . . . b2,2m
...
...
...
. . .
...
bn,1 bn,2 bn,3 . . . bn,2m
 , (3)
Then the n× 2m matrix divides them into two n×m
matrices, such that,
BF1 =

b1,1 b1,2 b1,3 . . . b1,m
b2,1 b2,2 b2,3 . . . b2,m
...
...
...
. . .
...
bn,1 bn,2 bn,3 . . . bn,m
 , (4)
BF2 =

b1,m+1 b1,m+2 . . . b1,2m
b2,m+1 b2,m+2 . . . b2,2m
...
...
. . .
...
bn,m+1 bn,m+2 . . . bn,2m
 . (5)
The two n×m matrices are then XORed element wise,
for e.g, b1,1 with b1,m+1, b2,1 with b2,m+1 and so on, as
shown in the inset of Fig. 1 (a). This creates a n × m
matrix as the output, as given in the Eq. (6).
BF3 =
b1,1 ⊕ b1,m+1 b1,2 ⊕ b1,m+2 . . . b1,m ⊕ b1,2m
b2,1 ⊕ b2,m+1 b2,2 ⊕ b2,m+2 . . . b2,m ⊕ b2,2m
...
...
. . .
...
bn,1 ⊕ bn,m+1 bn,2 ⊕ bn,m+2 . . . bn,m ⊕ bn,2m
 , (6)
where ⊕ represents the XOR operation. The value of m
determines the separation between the two bits that are
combined in the XOR gate. A larger m means less cor-
relation between bits. Hence, with a proper value of m,
the method presented here is equivalent to using two in-
dependent raw-bit sources, as demonstrated in Ref. [27].
Given that our randomness extraction procedure is ar-
guably information-theoretic secure, the quality of the
randomness of the extracted bits is tested using the stan-
dard NIST test suite as shown in section IV alongside
a measurement of the auto-correlation of the bits be-
fore and after extraction, shown in Fig 3. Finally, after
parallel-to-serial conversion, the bits from all RNEs form
a string of ready-to-use random bits. Thus we can achieve
an average generation rate of random numbers of nR/2,
where R = 1/T is the repetition rate of the pulsed laser
L1. We note that, compared with randomness extraction
using a cryptographic hash function [37], the employed
RNE method in our scheme imposes less performance on
the FPGA and is much easier to implement in real time.
However, it may result in losing more random bits than
necessary to obtain a final quantum-random bit string.
3III. PROOF-OF-PRINCIPLE
DEMONSTRATION
Figure 1 (b) shows a picture of the laser drivers and
lasers L1 and L2 used in our experimental demonstration
of the proposed scheme. The central wavelengths of both
lasers are at 1540 nm – they are matched and stabilized
by controlling the temperature of lasers within 0.01 °C.
The gain-switched laser is driven by a sequence of current
pulses that are generated from a radio-frequency transis-
tor switched on/off by an FPGA signal. The width of
the current pulse is ∼200 ps, and the repetition rate is
250 MHz. After interference with the output from the
(quasi)-continuous wave laser L2 in a polarization main-
taining 50/50 BS (used to match the polarization mode,
thus maximize the visibility of interference), the optical
signals are then detected by a commercial B-PD (Thor-
labs, PDB480C). It is worth noting that the balanced
detection scheme removes all common-mode noise, which
results in the improvement of the signal-to-noise ratio of
the detection signal. Figure 1 (c) shows typical signals
from B-PD, i.e. ∆V (t) given in Eq. (1). The dashed
line is the average of the detected signal. Please note
that, in our proof-of-principle demonstration, the ADC,
RNEs and parallel-to-serial conversion described above
have not been implemented using an FPGA. Instead, we
used a computer to process analog signals from B-PD
that have previously been sampled by a fast oscilloscope
(Lecroy, 8600A). Hence, while we demonstrate a proof-
of-principle of the proposed scheme, the random numbers
are not yet generated in real time.
IV. RESULTS
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FIG. 2. Probability density function of the normalized analog
signals, ∆V (t)
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As shown in Eq. (1), the phase uncertainty of the emit-
ted laser pulses affects ∆V (t) through the interference
and balanced photo-detection. Figure 2 shows the prob-
ability density function (PDF) of the normalized ∆V (t),
sampled at a pulse center. The dots represent the ex-
perimental results. The solid red line is the theoretical
prediction of the corresponding PDF which is,
p(x) = 1/(pi
√
1− x2), (7)
where x is the normalized analog output of the B-PD,
and the phase distribution is assumed to be uniform.
We attribute the deviation of our experimental results
from the theoretical prediction to additional amplitude
fluctuations in the detection signal that stem from clas-
sical sources, such as peak power fluctuations of laser
pulses, limited bandwidth of the B-PD, the finite sam-
pling rate and the noise of the oscilloscope. We estimate
the extent of these amplitude fluctuations by inputting
the laser pulses from L1 into one of the photo-detectors
of the B-PD and analyzing its output using the same
oscilloscope. Ideally, without the above-mentioned fluc-
tuations, we would expect a constant output from that
detector. However, we found an electrical signal whose
amplitude follows a Gaussian distribution with standard
deviation of ≤ 5% compared to the full range of the ob-
served electrical signal. We simulate the effect of these
classical fluctuations by adding them to the predicted val-
ues for the ideal case using a Monte-Carlo method. The
dashed line in Fig. 2 shows the good agreement of the re-
sult with the measured data. This allows us not only to
verify that the amplitude of each pulse is indeed random
(but not fully quantum-random), but also suggests ways
to improve the quality of the random numbers, such as
using a B-PD and ADC with larger bandwidth.
One of the main advantages of this random number
generation scheme is that more than one random bit can
be obtained per detection. The total range of the mea-
sured signal can be divided into 2n bins, and each signal
represented by n bits. The maximum number of bits,
nmax, that can be extracted is determined by the min-
entropy of the analog signal from B-PD,
Hmin = −log2(pmax) (8)
where pmax is the maximum probability for the detec-
tion amplitude to belong into any of the 2n bins. By
increasing the number of bins, we find that Hmin satu-
rates at 12.8 for n ≥ 13, indicating that pmax = 2−12.8
and nmax = 12 raw random bits can be extracted from
each pulse [30].
However these pulses contain entropy from both quan-
tum and classical sources. To estimate contribution from
quantum noise, the pmax of the quantum noise, quan-
tum min-entropy, is 2−6.49, which was estimated follow-
ing the procedure in [32]. We note that for this calcu-
lation, the classical noise is assumed to be independent
of quantum noise. The metrological approach to quan-
tify the randomness will be applied for future demon-
strations [31].We find an Hmin of 6.49, indicating that
4nmax = 6 quantum random bits can be extracted from
each pulse. To improve the quality of randomness, we
employ the randomness extraction procedure described
in section II, which reduces the information per laser
pulse from 12 to 6 bits. Although this satisfies the ap-
proved cryptographic conditioning components set forth
by NIST [40], we also used a more standard randomness
extraction procedure, i.e. the Toeplitz hashing matrix, to
validate the tests we perform. This matrix was set up to
similarly reduce the information per laser pulse from 12
to 6 bits. The following procedure was performed on both
sets of data. Therefore, with a clock rate of 250 MHz, 12-
bit binning and the randomness extraction, random bits
are obtained at 1.5 GHz, which is half of the maximum
of 3.0 GHz = 12× 250 MHz.
FIG. 3. Auto-correlation results for the random bits before
and after Hashing- or XORed- extraction.
To assess the quality of the final random bits obtained
from our setup, we first create a 1.25 Gbit-long ran-
dom file by saving measurement results from the oscil-
loscope and processing them in a computer. We mea-
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FIG. 4. Results of the NIST and Dieharder tests applied to
1.25 Gbits of random bits. (a) The proportion of passes of
each test in the NIST suite for 600 1-Mb-long samples. All
tests are passed with a proportion value greater than 0.9778
and less than 1; (b) the P-values of each individual (NIST)
test, obtained from the distribution of P-values of each of the
600 trials. For the tests, which produce multiple P-values
and proportions, the worst cases are given. (c) the P-values
of a select number of tests from the Dieharder test suite. All
tests are passed with 600 1-Mb-long samples and at a signif-
icance level of 0.0001 for the NIST tests and 0.0005 for the
DIEHARDER tests.
sure auto-correlation, see [24] for the formula used, of
the processed random bits before and after randomness
extraction with the Toeplitz hashing matrix or XOR op-
eration (with m = 7 explained later), and the results are
shown in Fig. 3. As can be seen, both extraction proce-
dures bring the correlation of the first few bits down to
the baseline level. We also subject the random bits to 2
statistical suites; The NIST STS (Statistical Test Suite)
which is a battery of fifteen tests used to analyze the
statistical properties of random numbers [38], and the
DIEHARDER [41] battery of tests which has the same
goals but is developed independantly of NIST. By moni-
toring the results of the NIST test as a function of m (i.e.
the length of the buffer in the RNEs), we find that with
m = 7, the obtained random file passes all the tests. It
is worth emphasizing that these test results do not mean
that our source is truly random, they can only assess the
5properties of the source [40].
For the NIST test, the significance level (α) is set at
0.01 as suggested by the test suite [38], implying that
one out of one hundred tests is expected to fail even if
the random numbers being tested are generated by a fair
random generator. Each of the fifteen tests is considered
a pass if the proportion of success versus fail is within a
range given by pˆ±3√pˆ(1− pˆ)/N , where N is the number
of times an individual test runs (N= 600 in our case), and
pˆ = 1 − α. This results in the proportion value greater
than 0.9778 and less than 1, a range that is indicated by
the two dashed lines in Fig. 4 (a). Next, a P-value is
obtained for each test from the distribution of P-values
over 600 trials. It is considered a pass if this P-value
is above the suggested significance level of 0.0001 [32].
As shown in Fig. 4, the random numbers from either
our XOR method or the standard randomness extraction
method pass all the NIST tests. Our result shows that
both our scheme to extract the randomness by sampling
vacuum fluctuations and the XOR method to extract the
quantum random bits are feasible, thus paves a practical
avenue to obtain quantum random bits with good quality.
V. CONCLUSION
We introduced and reported a proof-of-principle
demonstration of a new scheme for creating high-quality
quantum-random bits based on a gain-switched and a
(quasi)-continuous wave laser. The generation rate, cur-
rently 1.5 Gbps, can be further increased by operating
the gain-switched laser with higher repetition rate. While
this rate is fundamentally limited due to the need for laser
cavity depletion in-between subsequent pulses, rates of
several GHz for gain-switched laser are feasible [32, 33].
Combined with the possibility to create more than 10
random bits per laser pulse, we therefore predict that our
scheme can deliver high-quality quantum random num-
bers at rates of many tens of GHz. We note that, while
the present work was being finalized, a related experi-
mental demonstration using a photonics chip has been
reported [39, 42].
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